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Abstract
Debates over adults theory of mind use have been fueled by surprising failures
of visual perspective-taking in simple communicative tasks. Motivated by re-
cent computational models of context-sensitive language use, we reconsider the
evidence in light of the nuanced Gricean pragmatics of these tasks: the differen-
tial informativity expected of a speaker depending on the context. In particular,
when speakers are faced with asymmetries in visual access—when it is clear that
additional objects are in their partner’s view but not their own—our model pre-
dicts that they ought to adjust their utterances to be more informative. In Exp.
1, we explicitly manipulated the presence or absence of occlusions and found
that speakers systematically produced longer, more specific referring expressions
than required given their own view. In Exp. 2, we compare the scripted ut-
terances used by confederates in prior work with those produced by unscripted
speakers in the same task. We find that confederates are systematically less
informative than would be expected, leading to more listener errors. In addi-
tion to demonstrating a sophisticated form of speaker perspective-taking, these
results suggest a resource-rational explanation for why listeners may sometimes
neglect to consider visual perspective: it may be justified by adaptive Gricean
expectations about the likely division of joint cognitive effort.
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Introduction
Our success as a social species depends on our ability to understand, and be
understood by, different communicative partners across different contexts. The-
ory of mind—the ability to represent and reason about others’ mental states—is
considered to be the key mechanism that supports such context-sensitivity in
our everyday social interactions. Being able to reason about what others see,
want, and think allows us to make more accurate predictions about their fu-
ture behavior in different contexts and adjust our own behaviors accordingly
(Premack & Woodruff, 1978). Over the past two decades, however, there has
been sustained debate over the extent to which adults actually make of use
theory of mind in communication.
On one hand, accounts of language use in the tradition of Lewis (1969) and
Grice (1957, 1975) implicitly assume a fundamental and pervasive role for the-
ory of mind mechanisms. The meaning of an utterance is established against a
backdrop of inference, intention, and common ground : knowledge that is taken
to be shared by both parties (Clark, 1996; Stalnaker, 2002). This view of adults
as natural mind-readers is consistent with extensive evidence from the psy-
cholinguistics literature: for instance, we spontaneously calibrate our referential
expressions to our intended audiences (Fussell & Krauss, 1989) and make use
of partner-specific history (Brennan & Clark, 1996; Metzing & Brennan, 2003).
Yet in other cases the evidence appears to be more consistent with a more ego-
centric or “reflexively mind-blind” view of language processing (Keysar et al.,
1998b; Epley et al., 2004; Keysar, 2007; Barr, 2014). Under this view, although
adults have the ability to deploy theory of mind, it is effortful and costly to do
so. Thus people may initially anchor on their own perspective and only adjust
to account for other perspectives when a problem arises and when sufficient
cognitive resources are available.
Much of this debate has centered around the influential director-matcher
paradigm, a variant of classic reference games (Krauss & Weinheimer, 1964)
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where a confederate speaker gives participants instructions about how to move
objects around a grid. By introducing an asymmetry in visual access—certain
cells of the grid are covered such that participants can see objects that the
speaker cannot (e.g. Fig. 1)— Keysar et al. (2000) designed a task to expose
cases where participants (listeners) either succeed or fail to take into account
what the speaker sees. In particular, Keysar et al. (2000) argued that if listeners
were reliably using theory of mind, they would only consider mutually visible
objects as possible referents. For instance, on one trial a roll of Scotch tape was
mutually visible and a cassette tape was hidden from the speaker’s view. When
the confederate speaker produced an ambiguous utterance, “tape,” participants
should still interpret it as a reference to the mutually visible object even if it fits
the hidden object better; the idea is that a speaker who cannot see an object
wouldn’t possibly be referring to it.
While the visual asymmetries constructed by Keysar et al. (2000) may pro-
vide the starkest test of this hypothesis, variations on this basic paradigm have
manipulated other dimensions of non-visual knowledge asymmetry, including
those based on spoken information (Keysar et al., 1998a; Hanna et al., 2003),
spatial cues (Schober, 1993; Galati & Avraamides, 2013), private pre-training
Director’s View Matcher’s View
Figure 1: Critical trial of director-matcher task using the ambiguous utterance “the tape”: a
cassette tape is in view of both players, but a roll of tape is occluded from the speaker’s view.
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on object labels (Wu & Keysar, 2007), cultural background (Isaacs & Clark,
1987), and other task-relevant information (Hanna & Tanenhaus, 2004; Yoon
et al., 2012). Questions about speaker perspective-taking during production
have similarly been explored by reversing the direction of the asymmetry so
the speaker has private knowledge that the listener does not and examining
whether this private information leaks into their utterances (see also Nadig &
Sedivy, 2002; Heller et al., 2012; Brown-Schmidt & Tanenhaus, 2008; Savitsky
et al., 2011; Ryskin et al., 2015; Yoon & Brown-Schmidt, 2014; Lane et al.,
2006). Numerous rounds of reinterpretation and methodological criticism have
puzzled over seemingly contradictory findings in this sprawling body of work:
some studies find strong evidence consistent with an egocentric view—listeners
initially consider and even attempt to move such objects—while others find that
information from the speaker’s perspective is integrated from the very earliest
stages of processing (for reviews, see Barr & Keysar, 2006a; Brown-Schmidt &
Heller, 2018).
Recent computational models have begun to unify this literature under a
probabilistic framework. For instance, some models assume that listeners (Heller
et al., 2016) and speakers (Mozuraitis et al., 2018) simultaneously integrate their
own perspective with that of their partner, leading to behavior that lies between
purely egocentric and purely guided by common ground. These constraint-based
models (see also Brown-Schmidt & Hanna, 2011; Degen & Tanenhaus, to ap-
pear) introduce a probabilistic weighting parameter between the two domains
of reference and show that an intermediate weighting explains the gradient of
communicative behavior better than a purely egocentric or purely perspective-
adopting model. Yet these constraint-based models leave open a key puzzle for
rational models of language use: why do people use the proportion they do in
a given context? In other words, while different factors influencing the weight-
ing have been proposed, no formal mechanism yet explains why incorporating
egocentric knowledge would be adaptive when full common ground is available.
We argue in this paper for a resource rational account of perspective-taking
in communication (Griffiths et al., 2015; Shenhav et al., 2017). In a communica-
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tive interaction with another agent, the participants share the goal of success-
fully being understood while minimizing joint effort (Tomasello, 2009; Clark,
1996). If theory of mind use is indeed effortful and cognitively demanding to
some degree (Lin et al., 2010; Ferguson et al., 2015; Bradford et al., 2015), then
the question for a rational agent is when and how to best allocate its cognitive
resources to achieve its goals. This sets up a natural division of labor between
the speaker and listener in how the effort should be shared, which in principle
admits many solutions. Rather than being guided by rigid heuristics, individ-
uals may rationally and adaptively calibrate their perspective-taking based on
expectations about their partner’s likely behavior. Critically, these expectations
may themselves be derived from a targeted use of theory of mind.
Here, we explore one particular source of expectations derived from Gricean
expectations of informativity, which have been largely neglected by prior work
in the perspective-taking literature (but see Rubio-Ferna´ndez, 2017). Just as
making sense of an agent’s physical behaviors requires a broad, accurate mental
model of how the agent’s visual access, beliefs, and intentions translate into
motor plans (Jara-Ettinger et al., 2016; Baker et al., 2017), making sense of an
agent’s linguistic behaviors depends on an accurate model of what a speaker
would say, or what a listener would understand, in different situations (Bergen
& Grodner, 2012; Goodman & Frank, 2016; Frank & Goodman, 2012; Goodman
& Stuhlmu¨ller, 2013; Franke & Ja¨ger, 2016). From this perspective, theory of
mind use not only incorporates peoples mental models of a partners knowledge
or visual access but also their inferences about how their partner would behave
in a communicative context. To instantiate this account, we elaborate the fam-
ily of probabilistic weighting models by proposing that theory of mind use under
knowledge asymmetries not only involves integrating a partner’s knowledge but
also recursive reasoning about how they will likely produce or interpret utter-
ances in particular communicative contexts (Stuhlmller & Goodman, 2014).
The Gricean notion of cooperativity (Grice, 1975; Clark, 1996) refers to the
idea that speakers try to avoid saying things that are confusing or unnecessarily
complicated given the current context, and that listeners expect this. For in-
5
stance, imagine trying to help someone spot your dog at a busy dog park. It may
be literally correct to call it a “dog,” but as a cooperative speaker you would
understand that the listener would have trouble disambiguating the referent
from many other dogs. Likewise, the listener would reasonably expect you to
say something more informative than “dog” in this context. You may therefore
prefer to use a more specific or informative expressions, like “the little terrier
with the blue collar.” (Brennan & Clark, 1996; van Deemter, 2016). Critically,
you might do so even when you happen to see only one dog at the moment,
but know there are likely to be other dogs from the listener’s point of view. In
the presence of uncertainty about their partner’s visual context, a cooperative
speaker may tend toward additional specificity.
Now, what level of specificity is pragmatically appropriate in the particu-
lar director-matcher task used by Keysar et al. (2003)? This task requires the
speaker to generate a description such that a listener can identify the correct ob-
ject among distractors, even though several cells are hidden from the speaker’s
view (e.g. Fig. 2, bottom). It is thus highly salient to the speaker that there
are hidden objects she cannot see but her partner can. Gricean reasoning, as
realized by recent formal models (Goodman & Frank, 2016; Frank & Goodman,
2012; Franke & Ja¨ger, 2016), predicts that a speaker in this context will com-
pensate for her uncertainty about the listener’s visual context by increasing the
informativity of her utterance beyond what she would produce in a completely
shared context. (See Appendix A for a formal model of pragmatic reasoning in
this situation and a mathematical derivation of the informativity prediction.)1.
The director-matcher task used by Keysar et al. (2003) is therefore not only
challenging for the listener; it also requires a sophisticated use of theory of
mind, vis a vis pragmatic reasoning, on the part of the speaker, to understand
that the listener may expect her to increase the informativity of her utterance.
1Note that this notion of uncertainty about the content of the listener’s visual display is
independent of the notion of gradient (vs. binary) representations of common ground proposed
by Brown-Schmidt (2012)
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While extensive prior work has examined how speakers adjust their utterances,
or not, depending on their own private information, it remains untested how
they pragmatically compensate for their lack of access to the listener’s private
information by flexibly modifying their informativity.
In the following experiments, we ask whether people, as speakers, show such
sensitivity to their own uncertainty about their partner’s visual access. Further-
more, we suggest that such sensitivity (and the listener’s expectations about
this sensitivity) can help us understand why listeners in prior work (e.g., in the
Director-Matcher task) made frequent errors. A listener’s rational reliance on
the speaker’s informativity, which allows them to efficiently neglect the speaker’s
visual access under cognitive load, may backfire and lead to errors when paired
with a confederate speaker who violates Gricean expectations. First, we di-
rectly test our model’s prediction by manipulating the presence and absence of
occlusions in a simple, interactive, natural-language reference game. Second, we
conduct a replication of Keysar et al. (2003) with an additional unscripted con-
dition to evaluate whether the scripted referring expressions used by confederate
speakers in prior work accord with what a real speaker would say in the same
interactive context (Kuhlen & Brennan, 2013; Bavelas & Healing, 2013; Tanen-
haus & Brown-Schmidt, 2008). If confederate speakers were using scripts that
were uncooperative and underinformative compared to what speakers naturally
say, this previously unrecognized violation of Gricean expectations may have
implications for the rational basis of listener errors. Our main goal here is to
directly establish the adaptive pragmatic behavior of speakers. It is important
to note that our broader claim about the source of listener errors emerges from
establishing the plausibility of a resource-rational basis for perspective-neglect,
showing that speakers are adaptive (Exp.1) and listeners indeed make more er-
rors when speakers violate their expectations (Exp.2); causally manipulating
listener expectations is beyond the scope of the current work. We return to the
broader implications and predictions of this account in the discussion.
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Experiment 1: Speaker behavior under uncertainty
How does an unscripted speaker change her communicative behavior when
there is uncertainty about exactly what her partner can see? To address this
question empirically, we randomly assigned participants to the roles of speaker
and listener and paired them over the web to play an interactive communication
task (Hawkins, 2015).
Methods
Participants
We recruited 102 pairs of participants from Amazon Mechanical Turk and
randomly assigned speaker and listener roles. After we removed 7 games that
disconnected part-way through and 12 additional games according to our pre-
registered exclusion criteria (due to being non-native English speakers, reporting
confusion about the instructions, or clearly violating the instructions), we were
left with a sample of 83 full games.
Materials & Procedure
On each trial, both players were presented with a 3× 3 grid containing ob-
jects. One target object was privately highlighted for the speaker, who freely
typed a message into a chat box in order to get the listener to click the intended
referent. The objects varied along three discrete features (shape, texture, and
color), each of which took four discrete values (64 possible objects). See Ap-
pendix Fig. 7 for a screenshot of the interface.
There were four types of trials, forming a within-pair 2× 2 factorial design.
We manipulated the presence or absence of occlusions and the closeness of shared
distractors to the target (see Fig. 2). On ‘shared’ trials, all objects were seen
by both participants, but on ‘hidden’ trials, two cells of the grid were covered
with occluders (curtains) such that only the listener could see the contents of
the cell. On ‘far’ trials, the target is the only object with a particular shape; on
‘close’ trials, there is also a shared distractor with the target’s shape, differing
only in color or texture.
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Figure 2: Design used in Exp. 1 (from speaker’s view; grey square indicates target).
In order to make it clear to the speaker that there could really be objects
behind the occluders without providing a statistical cue to their identity or
quantity on any particular trial, we randomized the total number of distractors
in the grid on each trial (between 2 and 4) as well as the number of those
distractors covered by curtains (1 or 2). If there were only two distractors,
we did not allow both of them to be covered: there was always at least one
visible distractor. Each trial type appeared 6 times for a total of 24 trials, and
the sequence of trials was pseudo-randomized such that no trial type appeared
more than twice in each block of eight trials. Participants were instructed to
use visual properties of the objects rather than spatial locations in the grid.
Finally, we collected mouse-tracking data analogous to the eye-tracking com-
mon in referential paradigms. We asked the matcher to wait until the director
sent a message; when the message was received, the matcher clicked a small cir-
cle in the center of the grid to show the objects and proceed with the trial. We
recorded at 100Hz from the matcher’s mouse in the decision window after this
click, until the point where they clicked and started to drag one of the objects.
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Figure 3: Results for Exp. 1. (A) Speakers used significantly more words when occlusions
were present. This effect is larger than the simple pragmatic effect of a close distractor. (B)
Utterances broken out by feature mentioned. Error bars on empirical data are bootstrapped
95% confidence intervals; model error bars are 95% credible intervals.
While we did not intend to analyze these data for Exp. 1, we anticipated using
it in our second experiment below and wanted to use the same procedure across
experiments for consistency.
Behavioral results
Our primary measure of speaker behavior is the length (in words) of naturally
produced referring expressions sent through the chat box. We tested differences
in speaker behavior across conditions using a mixed-effect regression of context
and occlusion on the number of words produced, with maximal random effect
structure containing intercept, slopes, and interaction. First, as a baseline, we
examined the simple effect of close vs. far contexts in trials with no occlusions.
We found that speakers used significantly more words on average when there
was a distractor in context that shared the same shape as the target (b =
0.56, t = 5.1, p < 0.001; see Fig. 3A). This replicates the findings of prior
studies in experimental pragmatics (e.g Brennan & Clark, 1996; Monroe et al.,
2017). Next, we turn to the simple effect of occlusion in far contexts (which
are most similar to the displays used in the director-matcher task which we
adopt in Exp. 2 (Keysar et al., 2003)). Speakers used 1.25 additional words on
average when they knew their partner could potentially see additional objects
(t = 7.5, p < 0.001). Finally, we found a significant interaction (b = −0.49, t =
10
3.8, p < 0.001) where the effect of occlusion was larger in far contexts, likely
indicating a ceiling on the level of informativity required to individuate objects
in our simple stimulus space.
What are these additional words used for? As a secondary analysis, we
annotated each utterance based on which of the three object features were men-
tioned (shape, texture, color). Because speakers nearly always mentioned shape
(e.g. ‘star’, ‘triangle’) as the head noun of their referring expression regardless
of context (∼ 99% of trials), differences in utterance length across conditions
must be due to differentially mentioning the other two features (color and tex-
ture). To test this observation, we ran separate mixed-effect logistic regressions
for color and texture predicting mention from context; due to convergence is-
sues, the maximum random effect structure supported by our data contains only
speaker-level intercepts and slopes for the occlusion effect. We found simple ef-
fects of occlusion in far contexts for both features (b = 1.33, z = 2.9, p = 0.004
for color; b = 4.8, z = 6.4, p < 0.001 for texture, see Fig. 3B). In other words,
in displays like the left column of Fig. 2 where the target was the only ‘star’,
speakers were somewhat more likely to produce the star’s color—and much more
likely to produce its texture—when there were occlusions present, even though
shape alone is sufficient to disambiguate the target from visible distractors in
both cases. Finally, we note that listener errors were rare: 88% of listeners made
only one or fewer errors (out of 24 trials), and there was no significant difference
in error rates across the four conditions (χ2(3) = 1.23, p = 0.74). We test the
connections between context-sensitive speaker behavior and listener error rates
more explicitly in Exp. 2.
Model comparison
While our behavioral results provide qualitative support for a Gricean ac-
count over an egocentric account, formalizing these two accounts in compu-
tational models allows a stronger test of our hypothesis by generating graded
quantitative predictions. We formalized both accounts in the probabilistic Ra-
tional Speech Act (RSA) framework (Frank & Goodman, 2012; Goodman &
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Figure 4: Modeling results for Exp. 1. Posterior predictives of each model are projected to
the mean number of features produced in each condition (top) and directly compared to data
across all context types, varying occlusion, number of distractors, and types of distractors
(bottom). Error bars on empirical data are bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals; model
error bars are 95% credible intervals.
Frank, 2016; Franke & Ja¨ger, 2016; Kao et al., 2014; Goodman & Stuhlmu¨ller,
2013), which has successfully captured a variety of other pragmatic phenomena.
In this framework, speakers are decision-theoretic agents attempting to (soft-
)maximize a utility function balancing parsimony (i.e., a preference for shorter,
simpler utterances) with informativeness (i.e., the likelihood of an imagined lis-
tener agent having the intended interpretation). The only difference between
the two accounts in the RSA framework is how the asymmetry in visual access
is handled: the ‘occlusion-blind’ speaker simply assumes that the listener sees
the same objects as she herself sees, while the ‘occlusion-sensitive’ speaker rep-
resents uncertainty over her partner’s visual context. In particular, she assumes
a probability distribution over the possible objects that might be hidden behind
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the occlusions and attempts to be informative on average. The two models have
the same four free parameters: a speaker optimality parameter controlling the
soft-max temperature, and three parameters controlling the costs of producing
the features of shape, color, and texture (see Appendix B for details).
We conducted a Bayesian data analysis to infer these parameters condition-
ing on our empirical data, and computed a Bayes Factor to compare the models.
We found extremely strong support for the occlusion-sensitive model relative to
the occlusion-blind model (BF = 2.2 × 10209; see Appendix Fig. 8 for likeli-
hoods). To examine the pattern of behavior of each model, we computed the
posterior predictive on the expected number of features mentioned in each trial
type of our design. While the occlusion-blind speaker model successfully cap-
tured the simple effect of close vs. far contexts, it failed to account for behavior
in the presence of occlusions. The occlusion-sensitive model, on the other hand,
accurately accounted for the full pattern of results (see Fig 4). Finally, we ex-
amined parameter posteriors for the occlusion-sensitive model (see Appendix
Fig. 9): the inferred production cost for texture was significantly higher than
that for the other features, reflecting the asymmetry in production of texture
relative to color.
Experiment 2: Comparing confederates to natural speakers
Experiment 1 directly tested the hypothesis that speakers increase their
specificity in contexts with asymmetry in visual access. We found that speak-
ers are not only context-sensitive in choosing referring expressions that distin-
guish target from distractors in a shared context, but are occlusion-sensitive,
adaptively compensating for uncertainty. Critically, this resulted in systematic
differences in behavior across the occlusion conditions that are difficult to ex-
plain under an egocentric theory: in the presence of occlusions, speakers were
spontaneously willing to spend additional time and keystrokes to give further in-
formation beyond what they produce in the corresponding unoccluded contexts,
even though that information is equally redundant given the visible objects in
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their display.
These results validate our prediction that speakers appropriately increase
their level of specificity in contexts containing occlusions. In Experiment 2,
we recruited pairs of participants for an online, interactive version of the orig-
inal director-matcher task (Keysar et al., 2003) which used occluded contexts
to demonstrate limits on visual perspective-taking for the listener. Given the
results of Exp. 1, we predicted that participants in the director role (i.e. speak-
ers) would naturally provide more informative referring expressions than the
confederate directors used in prior work. This would suggest that the confed-
erate directors in prior work were pragmatically infelicitous, violating listeners’
expectations. This violation of listeners’ cooperative expectations may have led
to detrimental consequences for listener performance.
Methods
Participants
We recruited 200 pairs of participants from Amazon Mechanical Turk. 58
pairs were unable to complete the game due to a server outage. Following our
preregistered exclusion criteria, we removed 24 games who reported confusion,
violated our instructions, or made multiple errors on filler items, as well as 2
additional games containing non-native English speakers. This left 116 pairs in
our final sample.
Materials and Procedure
The materials and procedure were chosen to be as faithful as possible to
those reported in Keysar et al. (2003) while allowing for interaction over the
web. Directors used a chat box to communicate where to move a privately
cued target object in a 4× 4 grid (see Fig. 1). The listener then attempted to
click and drag the intended object. In each of 8 objects sets, mostly containing
filler objects, one target belonged to a ‘critical pair’ of objects, such as a visible
cassette tape and a hidden roll of tape that could both plausibly be called ‘the
tape.’
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We displayed instructions to the director as a series of arrows pointing from
some object to a neighboring unoccupied cell. Trials were blocked into eight sets
of objects, with four instructions each. As in Keysar et al. (2003), we collected
baseline performance by replacing the hidden alternative (e.g. a roll of tape) with
a filler object that did not fit the critical instruction (e.g. a battery) in half of
the critical pairs. The assignment of items to conditions was randomized across
participants, and the order of conditions was randomized under the constraint
that the same condition would not be used on more than two consecutive items.
All object sets, object placements, and corresponding instruction sets were fixed
across participants. In case of a listener error, the object was placed back in its
original position; both participants were given feedback and asked to try again.
We used a between-subject design to compare the scripted labels used by
confederate directors in prior work against what participants naturally say in
the same role. For participants assigned to the director role in the ‘scripted’
condition, a pre-scripted message using the precise wording from Keysar et al.
(2003) automatically appeared in their chat box on half of trials (the 8 critical
trials as well as nearly half of the fillers). Hence, the scripted condition served
as a direct replication. To maintain an interactive environment, the director
could freely produce referring expressions on the remainder of filler trials. In
the ‘unscripted’ condition, directors were unrestricted and free to send what-
ever messages they deemed appropriate on all trials. In addition to analyzing
messages sent through the chat box and errors made by matchers (listeners), we
collected mouse-tracking data in analogy to the eye-tracking common in these
paradigms.
Results
Listener errors
Our scripted condition successfully replicated the results of Keysar et al.
(2003) with even stronger effects: listeners incorrectly moved the hidden ob-
ject on approximately 50% of critical trials. However, on unscripted trials, the
listener error rate dropped by more than half, p1 = 0.51, p2 = 0.20, χ
2(1) =
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Figure 5: Listener results for Exp. 2. (A) Distribution of errors with scripted and unscripted
instructions. Participants in the unscripted condition made significantly fewer errors. (B)
Even when they were correct, listeners in the scripted condition were more likely to hover
their mouse cursor over the distractor relative to baseline while the unscripted condition
shows no difference.
43, p < 0.001 (Fig. 5A). While we found substantial heterogeneity in error rates
across object sets (just 3 of the 8 object sets accounted for the vast majority of
remaining unscripted errors; see Appendix Fig. 10), listeners in the unscripted
condition made fewer errors for nearly every critical item. In a maximal logistic
model with fixed effect of condition, random intercepts for each dyad, and ran-
dom slopes and intercepts for each object set, we found a significant difference
in error rates across conditions (z = 2.6, p = 0.008).
Even if participants in the unscripted condition make fewer actual errors,
they may still be considering the hidden object just as often on trials where
they go on to make correct responses. As a proxy for the eye-tracking analyses
reported by Keysar et al. (2003), we conducted a mouse-tracking analysis. We
computed the mean (logged) amount of time spent hovering over the hidden
distractor and found a significant interaction between condition and the contents
of the hidden cell (t = 3.59, p < 0.001; Fig. 5B) in a mixed-effects regression
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using dyad-level and object-level random intercepts and slopes for the difference
from baseline. Listeners in the scripted condition spent more time hovering over
the hidden cell when it contained a confusable distractor relative to baseline,
again replicating Keysar et al. (2003). In the unscripted condition there was no
difference from baseline.2
Speaker informativity
Next, we test whether these improvements in listener performance in the un-
scripted condition are accompanied by more informative speaker behavior than
the scripted utterances allowed. The simplest measure of speaker informativity
is the raw number of words used in referring expressions. Compared to the
scripted referring expressions, speakers in the unscripted condition used signif-
icantly more words to refer to critical objects (b = 0.54, t = 2.6, p = 0.019 in
a mixed-effects regression on difference scores using a fixed intercept and ran-
dom intercepts for object and dyads). However, this is a coarse measure: for
example, the shorter “Pyrex glass” may be more specific than “large measuring
glass” despite using fewer words. For a more direct measure, we extracted the
referring expressions generated by speakers in all critical trials and standard-
ized spelling and grammar, yielding 122 unique labels after including scripted
utterances.
We then recruited an independent sample of 20 judges on Amazon Me-
chanical Turk to rate how well each label fit the target and hidden distractor
objects on a slider from “strongly disagree” (meaning the label “doesn’t match
the object at all”) to “strongly agree” (meaning the label “matches the object
perfectly”). They were shown objects in the context of the full grid (with no
occlusions) such that they could feasibly judge spatial or relative references like
2Mean hover time was exactly zero for the majority of trials; we thus conducted a follow-up
analysis examining the binarized proportion of trials, and found the same pattern of results.
We also pre-registered an analysis of time elapsed before first hovering over the target but
due to unexpectedly poor precision in timing measurements, we did not pursue this analysis
further.
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Figure 6: Speaker results for Exp. 2. (A) While speakers in the scripted condition were forced
to use utterances that were judged to fit target and distractor roughly equally, speakers in the
unscripted condition naturally produced utterances that fit the target much better than the
distractor. (B) The extent to which an utterance fits the target more than the distractor is
highly predictive of error rates at an item-by-item level. All error bars are bootstrapped 95%
confidence intervals.
“bottom block.” We excluded 4 judges for guessing with response times < 1s.
Inter-rater reliability was relatively high, with intra-class correlation coefficient
of 0.54 (95%CI = [0.47, 0.61]). We computed the informativity of an utterance
(the tape) as the difference in how well it was judged to apply to the target (the
cassette tape) relative to the distractor object (the roll of tape).
Our primary measure of interest is the difference in informativity across
scripted and unscripted utterances. We found that speakers in the unscripted
condition systematically produced more informative utterances than the scripted
utterances (d = 0.5, 95% bootstrapped CI = [0.27, 0.77], p < .001; see Appendix
C for details). Scripted labels fit the hidden distractor just as well or better than
the target, but unscripted labels fit the target better and the hidden distractor
much worse (see Fig. 6A). In other words, the scripted labels used in Keysar
et al. (2003) were less informative than expressions speakers would normally
produce to refer to the same object in this context.
These results strongly suggest that the speaker’s informativity influences
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listener accuracy. In support of this hypothesis, we found a strong negative
correlation between informativity and error rates across items and conditions:
listeners make fewer errors when utterances are a better fit for the target relative
to the distractor (ρ = −0.81, bootstrapped 95% CI = [−0.9,−0.7]; Fig. 6B).
This result suggests that listener behavior is driven by an expectation of speaker
informativity: listeners interpret utterances proportionally to how well they fit
objects in context.
General Discussion
Are human adults expert mind-readers, or fundamentally egocentric? The
longstanding debate over the role of theory of mind in communication has largely
centered around whether listeners (or speakers) with private information con-
sider their partner’s perspective (Barr & Keysar, 2006a; Hanna et al., 2003).
Our work presents a more nuanced picture of how a speaker and a listener use
theory of mind to modulate their pragmatic expectations. The Gricean coop-
erative principle emphasizes a natural division of labor in how the joint effort
of being cooperative is shared (Clark, 1996; Mainwaring et al., 2003). It can be
asymmetric when one partner is expected to, and able to, take on more complex
reasoning than the other, in the form of visual perspective-taking, pragmatic
inference, or avoiding further exchanges of clarification and repair. One such
case is when the speaker has uncertainty over what the listener can see, as in
the director-matcher task. Our Rational Speech Act (RSA) formalization of co-
operative reasoning in this context predicts that speakers (directors) naturally
increase the informativity of their referring expressions to hedge against the in-
creased risk of misunderstanding; Exp. 1 presents direct evidence in support of
this hypothesis.
Importantly, when the director (speaker) is expected to be appropriately
informative, communication can be successful even when the matcher (listener)
does not reciprocate the effort. If visual perspective-taking is effortful and
cognitively demanding (Lin et al., 2010), the matcher will actually minimize
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joint effort by not taking the director’s visual perspective. This suggests a less
egocentric explanation of when and why listeners neglect the speaker’s visual
perspective; they do so when they expect the speaker to disambiguate referents
sufficiently. While adaptive in most natural communicative contexts, such ne-
glect might backfire and lead to errors when the speaker (inexplicably) violates
this expectation. From this point of view, the “failure” of listener theory of mind
in these tasks is not really a failure; instead, it suggests that both speakers and
listeners may use theory of mind to know when (and how much) they should ex-
pect others to be cooperative and informative, and subsequently allocate their
resources accordingly (Griffiths et al., 2015). Exp. 2 is consistent with this
hypothesis; when directors used underinformative scripted instructions (taken
from prior work), listeners made significantly more errors than when speakers
were allowed to provide referring expressions at their natural level of informa-
tivity, and speaker informativeness strongly modulated listener error rates.
Our work adds to the growing literature on the debate over the role of
pragmatics in the director-matcher task. A recent study questions the com-
municative nature of the task itself by showing that selective attention alone
is sufficient for successful performance on this task, and that listeners become
suspicious of the director’s visual access when the director shows unexpectedly
high levels of specificity in their referring expressions (Rubio-Ferna´ndez, 2017).
Our results further sbolster the argument that pragmatic reasoning about ap-
propriate levels of informativity is an integral aspect of theory of mind use in
the director-matcher task (and communication more generally). Note however
that in Rubio-Ferna´ndez (2017), participants became suspicious, while in our
study participants overtrusted the speaker to be informative; a more detailed
look at differences between experimental paradigms, as well as further experi-
mental work, is necessary to better understand why participants had different
expectations about the speaker. Prior work also suggests that although speakers
tend to be over-informative in their referring expressions (Koolen et al., 2011) a
number of situational factors (e.g., perceptual saliency of referents) can modu-
late this tendency. Our work hints at an additional principle that guides speaker
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informativity: speakers maintain uncertainty about the listener’s visual context
and their ability to disambiguate the referent in that context.
Additionally, while our model builds on probabilistic models weighting dif-
ferent perspectives (Heller et al., 2016; Mozuraitis et al., 2018), we leave the
formal integration of resource-rational recursive reasoning mechanisms with
perspective-weighting mechanisms for future work. While Mozuraitis et al.
(2018) focused on cases where the speaker has private information unknown
to the listener, our model focuses on the reverse case: how speakers behave
when they know that the listener has additional private information (Keysar
et al., 2003). Furthermore, whether the allocation of resources, and ensuing
perspective neglect, is a fixed strategy or one that adjusts dynamically remains
an open question: given sufficient evidence of an unusually underinformative
partner, listeners may realize that vigilance about which objects are occluded
yields a more effective strategy for the immediate interaction. An important
direction for future work is to directly explore listener adaptability in adjusting
their use of visual perspective-taking as a function of Gricean expectations for
a given partner (Grodner & Sedivy, 2011; Pogue et al., 2016).
In sum, our findings suggest that language use is well-adapted to contexts
of uncertainty and knowledge asymmetry. The pragmatic use of theory of mind
to establish division of labor is also critical for other forms of social coopera-
tion, including pedagogy (Shafto et al., 2014) and team-based problem solving
(Woolley et al., 2010; Krafft, 2018). Enriching our notion of theory of mind use
to encompass these pragmatic expectations, not only expectations about what
our partner knows or desires, may shed new light on the flexibility of social
interaction more broadly.
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Appendix A: Derivation of qualitative model predictions
Our experiments are motivated by the Gricean observation that speakers
should attempt to be more informative when there is an asymmetry in visual
access, such that their partner sees something they do not. In this appendix,
we formalize this scenario in a computational model of communication as re-
cursive social reasoning and prove that the predicted increase in informativity
qualitatively holds under fairly unrestrictive conditions.
Following recent advances in the Rational Speech Act (RSA) framework,
we define a speaker as a decision-theoretic agent who must choose a referring
expression u to refer to a target object o in a context C by (soft)-maximizing a
utility function U :
S(u|o, C) ∝ exp{αU(u; o, C)}
Definition. The basic utility used in RSA models captures the informativeness
of each utterance to an imagined literal listener agent L who is attempting to
select the target object from alternatives in context:
Ubasic(u; o, C) = logL(o|u,C)
This information-theoretic expression measures how certain the listener be-
comes about the intended object after hearing the utterance. The literal listener
is assumed to update their beliefs about the target object according to Bayesian
inference, conditioning on the literal meaning of the utterance being true of it:
L(o|u,C) ∝ L(o, u)P (o)
where normalization takes place over objects o ∈ C and L represents the lexical
semantics of u. If u is true of o then L(o, u) = 1; otherwise, L(o, u) = 0.
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This basic setup assumes that the speaker reasons about a listener sharing
the same context C in common ground. How should it be extended to handle
asymmetries in visual access between the speaker and listener, where the speaker
has uncertainty over the possible distractors behind the occlusions? In the RSA
framework, speaker uncertainty is represented straightforwardly by a prior over
the state of the world: for example, Goodman & Stuhlmu¨ller (2013) examined
a case where the speaker has limited perceptual access to the objects they are
describing. For the director-matcher task, we construct this prior by positing a
space of alternative objects O, introducing uncertainty P (oh) over which object
oh ∈ O, if any, is hidden behind an occlusion, and marginalizing over these
alternatives when reasoning about the listener.
Definition. This gives us a utility for conditions of asymmetries in visual ac-
cess:
Uasym(u; o, C) =
∑
oh∈O
P (oh) logL(o|u,C ∪ oh)
where C denotes the set of objects in context that the speaker perceives.
We define “specificity” extensionally, in the sense that if u0 is more specific
than u1, then the objects for which u0 is true is a subset of the objects for which
u1 is true:
Definition. Utterance u0 is said to be more specific than u1 iff L(u0, oh) ≤
L(u1, oh) ∀oh ∈ O and there exists a subset of objects O∗ ⊂ O such that∑
o∗∈O∗ P (o
∗) > 0 and L(u0, o∗) < L(u1, o∗) for o∗ ∈ O∗.
We now show that the recursive reasoning model predicts that speakers
should prefer more informative utterances in contexts with occlusions. In other
words, that the asymmetry utility leads to a preference for more specific referring
expressions than the basic utility.
Theorem. If u0 is more specific than u1, then the following holds for any target
ot and shared context C:
Sasym(u0|ot, C)
Sasym(u1|ot, C) >
Sbasic(u0|ot, C)
Sbasic(u1|ot, C)
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Proof. Since S(u0|ot, C)/S(u1|ot, C) = exp(α · (U(u0; ot, C) − U(u1; ot, C))) it
is sufficient to show
Uasym(u0; o, C)− Uasym(u1; o, C) > Ubasic(u0; o, C)− Ubasic(u1; o, C)
We first break apart the sum on the left-hand side:
Uasym(u0|ot, C)− Uasym(u1|ot, C) =
∑
oh∈O
p(oh) [logL(o|u0, C ∪ oh)− logL(o|u1, C ∪ oh)]
=
∑
o∗∈O∗
p(o∗) log
L(ot|u0, C ∪ o∗)
L(ot|u1, C ∪ o∗) (1)
+
∑
oh∈O\O∗
p(oh) log
L(ot|u0, C ∪ oh)
L(ot|u1, C ∪ oh) (2)
By the definition of “more specific” and because we defined o∗ ∈ O∗ to be
precisely the subset of objects for which L(u0, o∗) < L(u1, o∗), for objects oh in
the complementary set O \ O∗ we have L(u0, oh) = L(u1, oh). Therefore, for 2,
L(ot|ui, C ∪ oh) = L(ot|ui, C), giving us log L(o
t|u0,C)
L(ot|u1,C)
∑
oh∈O\O∗ p(oh)
For the ratio in 1, we can substitute the definition of the listener L and
simplify:
L(ot|u0, C ∪ o∗)
L(ot|u1, C ∪ o∗) =
L(ot, u0)[
∑
o∈C∪o∗ L(o, u1)]
L(ot, u1)[
∑
o∈C∪o∗ L(o, u0)]
=
L(ot, u0)[
∑
o∈C L(o, u1) + L(o∗, u1)]
L(ot, u1)[
∑
o∈C L(o, u0) + L(o∗, u0)]
<
L(ot, u0)[
∑
o∈C L(o, u1)]
L(ot, u1)[
∑
o∈C L(o, u0)]
=
L(ot|u0, C)
L(ot|u1, C)
Thus,
Uasym(u0|ot, C)− Uasym(u1|ot, C) < log L(o
t|u0,C)
L(ot|u1,C)
 ∑
o∗∈O∗
p(o∗) +
∑
oh∈O\O∗
p(oh)

= logL(ot|u0, C)− logL(ot|u1, C)
= Ubasic(u0|ot, C)− Ubasic(u1|ot, C)
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Note that this proof also holds when an utterance-level cost term cost(u)
penalizing longer or more effortful utterances is incorporated into the utilities
Uasym(u; o, Cs) =
∑
oh∈O logL0(o|u,Cs ∪ oh)P (oh)− cost(u)
Ubasic(u; o, C) = logL(o|u,C)− cost(u)
since the same constant appears on both sides of inequality. In principle, it
can also be extended to real-valued meanings L, though additional assumptions
must be made.
Appendix B: Quantitative model fit for Exp. 1
In addition to the qualitative predictions derived in the previous section, our
speaker model makes direct quantitative predictions about Exp. 1 data. Here,
we describe the details of a Bayesian Data Analysis evaluating this model on
the empirical data, and comparing it to an occlusion-blind model which does
not reason about possible hidden objects.
Because there were no differences observed in production based on the par-
ticular levels of target features (e.g. whether the target was blue or red), we
collapse across these details and only feed the model which features of each
distractor differed from the target on each trial. After this simplification, there
were only 4 possible contexts: far contexts, where the distractors differed in ev-
ery dimension, and three varieties of close contexts, where the critical distractor
differed in only shape, shape and color, or shape and texture. In addition, we
included in the model information about whether each trial had cells occluded
or not.
The space of utterances used in our speaker model is derived from our feature
annotations: for each trial, the speaker model selected among 7 utterances
referring to each combination of features: only mentioning the target’s shape,
only mentioning the target’s color, mentioning the shape and the color, and so
on. For the set of alternative objectsO, we used the full 64-object stimulus space
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used in our experiment design, and we placed a uniform prior over these objects
such that the occlusion-sensitive speaker assumed they were equally likely to be
hidden.
Our model has four free parameters which we infer from the data using
Bayesian inference3. The speaker optimality parameter, α, is a soft-max tem-
perature such that at α = 1, the speaker produces utterances directly propor-
tional to their utility, and as α → ∞ the speaker maximizes. In addition, to
account for the differential production of the three features (see Fig. 2B), we
assume separate production costs for each feature: a texture cost ct, a color
cost cc, and a shape cost cs. We use (uninformative) uniform priors for all
parameters:
α ∼ Unif(0, 50)
ct, cc, cs ∼ Unif(0, 10)
We compute speaker predictions for a particular parameter setting using (nested)
enumeration and infer the posterior over parameters using MCMC. We discard
5000 burn-in samples and then take 5000 samples from the posterior with a lag
of 2. Our posterior predictives are computed from these posteriors by taking the
expected number of features produced by the speaker marginalizing over param-
eters and possible non-critical distractors in context (this captures the statistics
of our experimental contexts, where there was always a distractor sharing the
same color or texture but a different shape as the target). Finally, to precisely
compute the Bayes Factor, we enumerated over a discrete grid of parameter
values in the prior. We implemented our models and conducted inference in the
probabilistic programming language WebPPL (Goodman & Stuhlmuller, 2014).
All code necessary to reproduce our model results are available at the project
github: https://github.com/hawkrobe/pragmatics of perspective taking.
3Note that this use of Bayesian statistics in analyzing and evaluating our cognitive model is
completely dissociable from the assumption of Bayesian recursive reasoning within the model.
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Appendix C: Multi-stage bootstrap procedure for Expt. 2
The statistical dependency structure of our ratings was more complex than
standard mixed-effect model packages are designed to handle and the summary
statistic we needed for our test was a simple difference score across conditions, so
we instead implemented a simple multi-stage, non-parametric bootstrap scheme
to appropriately account for different sources of variance. In particular, we
needed to control for effects of judge, item, and speaker.
First, to control for the repeated measurements of each judge rating the
informativity of all labels, we resampled our set of sixteen judge ids with re-
placement. For each label, we then computed informativity as the difference
between the target and distractor fits within every judge’s ratings, and took
the mean across our bootstrapped sample of judges. Next, we controlled for
item effects by resampling our eight item ids with replacement. Finally, we
resampled speakers from pairs within each condition (scripted vs. unscripted),
and looked up the mean informativity of each utterance they produced for each
of the resampled set of items. Now, we can take the mean within each con-
dition and compute the difference across conditions, which is our desired test
statistic. We repeated this multi-stage resampling procedure 1000 times to get
the bootstrapped distribution of our test statistic that we reported in the main
text. Individual errors bars in Fig. 4 are derived from the same procedure but
without taking difference scores.
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Figure 7: Screenshot of experiment interface.
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Figure 8: Supplementary figure of model likelihoods.
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Figure 9: Supplementary figure of parameter posteriors. All parameters shown on log scale.
MAP estimates with 95% highest posterior density intervals are as follows: α = 23.9, HDI =
[21.0, 25.9]; ccolor = 3.9× 10−5, HDI = [2.5× 10−5, 3.9× 10−4]; cshape = 2.9× 10−5, HDI =
[1.3× 10−5, 1.1× 10−4]; ctexture = 6.6× 10−3, HDI = [3.1× 10−3, 1.2× 10−2]
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Figure 10: Supplementary figure of heterogeneity in errors across the 8 object sets used in
Exp. 2 (from Keysar, 2003). Error rates across object diverge significantly from a uniform
distribution in both scripted (χ2 = 55, p < 0.001) and unscripted (χ2 = 36, p < 0.001)
conditions under a non-parametric χ2 test.
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